TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/110590/1105008.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 12.1 KB | 273 lines

                                                                                WORLD, Page 38

THE GULF

Wait a Minute


The mere whiff of a deal presses Washington to reinforce its
stance against Iraq. Will more troops persuade Saddam to
surrender?

By MICHAEL KRAMER -- Reported by William Dowell at the Saudi-
Kuwaiti border and Dan Goodgame and Bruce van Voorst/Washington


    Where was the gulf pendulum last week -- closer to war or
to peace? As the fall and rise of world oil prices
demonstrated, it was swinging wildly from one side to the
other. Rumors of a dream -- the release of some hostages --
talk of possible deals, growing alarm at the costs of war, all
sparked a flush of optimism that diplomacy could save the day.

    By week's end, though, the prevailing sounds were decidedly
hawkish. Whatever the conciliatory talk elsewhere, Washington
was having none of it, at least in public. George Bush blasted
suggestions that a trade could be made to induce Saddam Hussein
to withdraw. "I am more determined than ever to see that this
invading dictator gets out of Kuwait with no compromise of any
kind whatsoever," he said. To ensure that Saddam perceives the
military alliance ranged against him as "credible," and to
achieve an offensive capability beyond the "defend and deter"
mission described as Washington's objective to date, Defense
Secretary Dick Cheney signaled that as many as 100,000
additional U.S. troops would soon join the 210,000 already in
the gulf. At the same time, CIA Director William Webster said
the Middle East would never be secure until Saddam was removed
from power or "disassociated" from his weapons of mass
destruction.

    Only the Soviets, who had told nonaligned members of the
Security Council last week that Saddam was not interested in
negotiation, continued to hold out hope. On Saturday President
Gorbachev said the Iraqi leadership may be softening its hard
line, so military force should not be used.

    But the Cheney-Webster message was unmistakable: there may
be no way out short of war. But a growing ambivalence pervades
the enterprise nonetheless. The "wait a minute" second thoughts
echoing on Capitol Hill -- a skittishness in marked contrast
to the "let's get him" talk of several weeks ago -- reflects
an increasing reluctance among the American public to start
shooting.

    The Pentagon itself has been soberly reassessing the costs
of conflict. The quick and clean scenarios floated brashly in
September have been tossed aside. If war comes, said Cheney,
"it won't be easy." So while the significant increase in allied
firepower helps telegraph Washington's seriousness of purpose,
it is military necessity as much as psychological posturing
that mandates the added punch.

    If the balloon goes up, winning will require more men and
equipment than previously acknowledged. The Iraqis have dug
deeper into Kuwait in recent weeks. Fortified bunkers and
minefields dot the country, and a network of roads increases
the mobility of Saddam's army. Barring a wholesale surrender
of the 430,000 Iraqi troops stationed in Kuwait and southern
Iraq, no force will liberate Kuwait without sustaining heavy
casualties.

    Given this more somber assessment of a war's costs, it is
no wonder that the parameters of a peaceful solution, a deal,
are being explored afresh by some of those who would bear the
brunt of conflict.

    To a certain extent, this is nothing new. Led by Washington,
the alliance has always followed a two-track policy. Get out
of Kuwait unconditionally, Saddam has been told, and your
claims to Kuwait's territory and oil can be addressed through
negotiation and arbitration. So, too, Bush and others have
signaled that a renewed drive for an overall regional peace
plan could follow an Iraqi retreat. Most of the West avoids
explicitly linking a gulf solution to an Arab-Israeli
settlement, but an implicit linkage in terms of Arab
expectations exists all the same.

    From the start, the problem of a peaceful resolution has
revolved around matters of timing. The U.S. and its allies have
insisted on an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait
before anyone talks about anything else. That bottom line
demand is rooted in a determination to deny Baghdad even a
token reward for its aggression. Few believe that Saddam would
leave quietly without the elements of a face-saving deal
squarely on the horizon, but the prospect of sketching a
settlement in advance causes apoplexy in Washington. This is
why war is seen as inevitable.

    It also explains why Cheney suddenly appeared on all four
U.S. television networks last Thursday. Only five days before,
Prince Sultan ibn Abdul Aziz, Saudi Arabia's Defense Minister,
had seemed to tie Kuwaiti land concessions too closely to an
Iraqi withdrawal. "We needed to dampen the talk of a peaceful
settlement that wafted around Sultan," says a White House aide.
"That's why Dick went public even before [Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman] Colin Powell got back to Washington to formally
request more troops."

    On close inspection, Sultan's remarks represented little if
any deviation from the allied position, but the message was
imprecise and a peace feeler was suspected. Speculation on what
lines a negotiated settlement might follow were also old hat:
a proposal to lease the strategically important Kuwaiti islands
of Bubiyan and Warba to Iraq, and a settlement of Baghdad's
claim that Kuwait was extracting too much oil from the Rumaila
oil field that straddles the Iraq-Kuwait border. Before the
Aug. 2 invasion, Kuwait was prepared to discuss these issues and
had even indicated it might accommodate Saddam's complaints.
In essence, Sultan simply repeated the allied proposition that
everything is negotiable, but only after Saddam retreats.

    Nevertheless, a concession to aggression was perceived.
James Akins, a former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, says the
Saudis "recognize that war would be a catastrophe for
everybody. Why shouldn't they at least explore a negotiated
settlement?" Whether Sultan intended a signal to Saddam or had
merely spoken sloppily, the Defense Minister immediately
claimed that he had been misinterpreted, but enough doubt
lingered to precipitate Cheney's hurried remark about additional
troops.

    The only people ecstatic about the dustup following Sultan's
comments are some Kuwaiti officials. They are certain they will
have their nation back, but they are worried that if Saddam
leaves Kuwait peacefully and with his military machine intact,
he will merely regroup for another foray on another day. And
they know the Kuwait they get back will not be the same country
they lost. "Whether Saddam goes quietly or is bombed out, the
place we return to will be a shell," says Finance Minister Ali
al-Khalifa al-Sabah. "We prefer liberation soon to halt Iraq's
daily atrocities against our people."

    For this and other reasons, not the least being revenge,
almost all Kuwaitis hope for a punishing war and are eager for
it to begin quickly. "You can view Sultan's statements as of
a piece," says a senior Kuwaiti official. "His remarks and the
search for a peaceful way out mean that when the decision to
fight is taken, as it will be taken, we will be able to say
that we tried to talk Iraq back and that war is the only option
left." The Kuwaitis welcome talk of peace for another reason
as well. They believe it perversely lures Saddam into staying
his course in the mistaken notion that the opposition against
him will fold. "We are certain that Saddam is reinforced in
the belief that the coalition against him is weakening, that
he will be able to keep Kuwait if only he hangs tough," says
the official. "As long as he keeps thinking like that and stays
put, we will have the opportunity to go after him militarily,
which is exactly what we Kuwaitis want to happen. The only way
of truly getting rid of this menace is to get rid of him once
and for all."

    Yes, but a peaceful resolution that accomplishes the same
thing, or close to it, would still be preferable. Besides the
incalculable costs of war, there is the question of what would
follow Saddam's defeat. The Middle East might become more
stable, or it might not. And the possibility of a continuing
terrorist retaliation for having taken out Saddam is chilling.
Abul Abbas, the man behind the Achille Lauro seajacking, told
the Wall Street Journal that "there is an Arabic saying that
revenge takes 40 years. Some day we will have missiles that can
reach New York."

    Leaving aside timing and appearance, would a trade of the
kind that attended Prince Sultan's comments fly? The Kuwaitis
want compensation for the looting of their nation. The pool of
frozen Iraqi assets and the oil revenues that would again flow
to Baghdad once the embargo is lifted could eventually satisfy
Kuwait on that score. Striking a bargain over drilling rights
in the Rumaila oil field is doable as well. Before the
invasion, Kuwait was extracting just 10,000 barrels a day from
Rumaila, less than 1% of the country's daily production, an
amount that could easily be covered by pumping more elsewhere.
Leasing Bubiyan and Warba islands to Baghdad would be harder,
if not for the Kuwaitis then for the Iranians. President Ali
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has said Iran will not tolerate Iraq's
control of the northern gulf, which is exactly what Iraq's
possession of the islands would yield. "We will act within our
means to stop" such a deal, Rafsanjani told the French daily
Le Monde two weeks ago.

    Assuming even this objection could be overridden, a simple
trade of the kind implied by Sultan's statement would probably
be insufficient for the reason CIA Director Webster stated:
Saddam's weapons. "We are ready for a long-term U.S. or U.N.
presence in our country," says a Kuwaiti aide to the exiled
Emir, "but we wouldn't deal on the islands or the oil unless
Iraq's war-fighting capacities are crippled. If Saddam gets
something from us that he can portray as a victory, then the
rest of the world is entitled to an even greater and
longer-lasting victory."

    Would Saddam accept a favorable resolution of his claims
against Kuwait in exchange for both withdrawing from Kuwait and
neutralizing his most fearsome military capabilities? This is
the point on which any deal would probably founder. It is
unlikely that Iraq would agree to any settlement that reduces
its own military without similarly reducing Israel's force.
Most Arab nations would certainly support such a demand.

    But even if that obstacle could be hurdled -- which is
surely a pipe dream -- there is still the tricky matter of
Saddam's ultimate designs. From his assumption of power in Iraq
in 1979, Saddam has sought regional hegemony: if not by
outright territorial conquest, then by the application of
military muscle to dictate oil-production quotas, pricing
arrangements and regional diplomacy. Beyond that, Saddam's
animosity toward Israel remains unappeased. Without his
military might, Saddam is just another bit player.

    There is still the possibility that Saddam will get smart,
leave Kuwait and go about increasing his powers of intimidation
by completing his nuclear weapons program. If he doesn't see
a need to withdraw to the status quo ante -- and there is no
sign yet that he "gets it," to borrow the phrase in vogue in
the White House -- it appears that much of the world is headed
toward war against the man George Bush once again last week
called "Hitler revisited."


____________________________________________________________
ELEMENTS OF A DEAL


    What Kuwait might accept:


    -- Iraq must withdraw completely from Kuwait and restore the
Emir.

    -- Only then might Kuwait negotiate a long-term Iraqi lease
of the strategic islands of Bubiyan and Warba.

    -- Kuwait could discuss ceding pumping rights in the Rumaila
oil field.

    -- Kuwait wants an international security force stationed
in its country.

    -- Iraq would have to reduce its army and neutralize its
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.